1 00:00:01,130 --> 00:00:14,390 [Music] 2 00:00:22,429 --> 00:00:18,859 I came to work for the dr. von Braun 3 00:00:25,040 --> 00:00:22,439 team in 1959 when he was still with the 4 00:00:27,019 --> 00:00:25,050 army ballistic missile agency when the 5 00:00:32,630 --> 00:00:27,029 army ballistic missile agency was 6 00:00:35,630 --> 00:00:32,640 transferred to NASA in 1960 dr. von 7 00:00:39,440 --> 00:00:35,640 Braun agreed with the army to leave the 8 00:00:41,630 --> 00:00:39,450 Persian weapon system office which was I 9 00:00:43,580 --> 00:00:41,640 was a part of behind to finish the 10 00:00:47,290 --> 00:00:43,590 development of that program and after 11 00:00:53,630 --> 00:00:47,300 that we would rejoin him at NASA in 12 00:00:55,520 --> 00:00:53,640 February of 1961 I joined the office of 13 00:00:58,069 --> 00:00:55,530 manned spaceflight system engineering 14 00:00:59,959 --> 00:00:58,079 and integration office as a part of the 15 00:01:01,939 --> 00:00:59,969 resident office here at the Marshall 16 00:01:03,680 --> 00:01:01,949 Space Flight Center was not working for 17 00:01:06,530 --> 00:01:03,690 Marshall was working for NASA 18 00:01:09,200 --> 00:01:06,540 headquarters at the time and in November 19 00:01:18,630 --> 00:01:09,210 of 1969 I John Marshall Space Flight 20 00:01:26,190 --> 00:01:22,920 a manager of the program control group 21 00:01:27,810 --> 00:01:26,200 within a Saturn 5 program office and my 22 00:01:30,600 --> 00:01:27,820 office had the responsibilities for 23 00:01:35,130 --> 00:01:30,610 scheduling all the launch vehicle 24 00:01:38,040 --> 00:01:35,140 activities also for budgeting of the 25 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:38,050 active is allocating resources to the 26 00:01:43,830 --> 00:01:42,010 various elements of the program and then 27 00:01:48,780 --> 00:01:43,840 later on I was assigned the 28 00:01:50,370 --> 00:01:48,790 responsibility of developing a and 29 00:01:52,710 --> 00:01:50,380 administering a configuration management 30 00:01:54,150 --> 00:01:52,720 system for baselining and controlling 31 00:01:56,190 --> 00:01:54,160 all the technical requirements and 32 00:01:58,490 --> 00:01:56,200 interfaces of the of the launch vehicle 33 00:02:01,560 --> 00:01:58,500 within and within the various stages 34 00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:01,570 within it that was a vehicle at the Cape 35 00:02:09,090 --> 00:02:04,330 and the vehicle and the spacecraft so it 36 00:02:11,100 --> 00:02:09,100 was a pretty demanding task which pretty 37 00:02:13,140 --> 00:02:11,110 much got me involved in about everything 38 00:02:15,180 --> 00:02:13,150 going on because anything had happened 39 00:02:19,410 --> 00:02:15,190 would usually affect the schedule or a 40 00:02:21,949 --> 00:02:19,420 budget and I had to be a part to that to 41 00:02:24,660 --> 00:02:21,959 help in in the in the dealing with it 42 00:02:28,890 --> 00:02:24,670 adjusting schedules reallocating 43 00:02:30,750 --> 00:02:28,900 resources to provide funding for areas 44 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:30,760 that that that were running a little bit 45 00:02:39,020 --> 00:02:32,410 behind schedule or we're having a 46 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:40,770 the Saturn was 47 00:02:46,170 --> 00:02:42,370 very much getting underway at that time 48 00:02:48,210 --> 00:02:46,180 was underway at that time we were in the 49 00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:48,220 early stages of the design and 50 00:02:53,070 --> 00:02:51,010 development phase not so much in the 51 00:02:56,309 --> 00:02:53,080 hardware phase on to many of the 52 00:02:58,440 --> 00:02:56,319 elements but the Saturn one was well 53 00:03:02,190 --> 00:02:58,450 underway the Saturn 1b was getting 54 00:03:04,710 --> 00:03:02,200 underway Saturn 5 was under contract to 55 00:03:07,590 --> 00:03:04,720 be started so a lot of activity was 56 00:03:09,990 --> 00:03:07,600 going on at the at the center especially 57 00:03:13,290 --> 00:03:10,000 on the s-1 sea stage the first 58 00:03:17,220 --> 00:03:13,300 propulsive stage of the Saturn 5 vehicle 59 00:03:24,300 --> 00:03:17,230 and on the instrument unit for both the 60 00:03:31,440 --> 00:03:27,900 our early challenges were getting 61 00:03:34,650 --> 00:03:31,450 facilities in place the Mississippi test 62 00:03:37,580 --> 00:03:34,660 facility was a kind of a swamp down in 63 00:03:40,440 --> 00:03:37,590 Mississippi the way to get that built 64 00:03:42,030 --> 00:03:40,450 the Kennedy Space Center was a part of 65 00:03:44,940 --> 00:03:42,040 the Marshall Space Flight Center at that 66 00:03:47,250 --> 00:03:44,950 time they were spun off to Marshall 67 00:03:50,309 --> 00:03:47,260 became a separate Center and they were 68 00:03:53,870 --> 00:03:50,319 busy purchasing land and building the 69 00:03:57,240 --> 00:03:53,880 launch complex designing a means for 70 00:03:59,940 --> 00:03:57,250 checking out the vehicle rolling it out 71 00:04:02,460 --> 00:03:59,950 to the pad launching it so a lot of 72 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:02,470 activities going that way on that way we 73 00:04:09,449 --> 00:04:05,610 had a lot of work in-house at Marshall 74 00:04:12,600 --> 00:04:09,459 only s1c stage because Marshall was 75 00:04:16,259 --> 00:04:12,610 responsible for building I think it was 76 00:04:19,050 --> 00:04:16,269 four of the first flight four of the 77 00:04:22,230 --> 00:04:19,060 five ground test articles at that time 78 00:04:25,050 --> 00:04:22,240 and two of the first flight articles for 79 00:04:28,140 --> 00:04:25,060 the vehicle Marshall was also busy 80 00:04:29,790 --> 00:04:28,150 designing and building in-house the 81 00:04:31,500 --> 00:04:29,800 instrument unit for the Saturn wouldn't 82 00:04:35,370 --> 00:04:31,510 be in the Saturn five so there was a lot 83 00:04:37,890 --> 00:04:35,380 of activity going on at the center as 84 00:04:41,100 --> 00:04:37,900 well as well other things that were 85 00:04:45,480 --> 00:04:41,110 going on was the designing and testing 86 00:04:49,710 --> 00:04:45,490 of the umbilical arms that were used at 87 00:04:52,980 --> 00:04:49,720 the Cape we also were busy designing 88 00:04:54,510 --> 00:04:52,990 developing fabricating the ground 89 00:04:56,909 --> 00:04:54,520 support equipment that was used for 90 00:04:59,670 --> 00:04:56,919 checking out the launch vehicle at the 91 00:05:03,420 --> 00:04:59,680 Cape so there was just a lot of activity 92 00:05:05,840 --> 00:05:03,430 going on here in addition we were busy 93 00:05:09,110 --> 00:05:05,850 kind of getting our contractors on board 94 00:05:12,420 --> 00:05:09,120 to assume the responsibility for the 95 00:05:15,150 --> 00:05:12,430 fabrication and and and really building 96 00:05:17,010 --> 00:05:15,160 and delivery of the flight stages for 97 00:05:18,779 --> 00:05:17,020 the entire vehicle so a lot of 98 00:05:21,740 --> 00:05:18,789 activities going on getting them up to 99 00:05:25,500 --> 00:05:21,750 speed Marshall had a yeah a real jump on 100 00:05:27,360 --> 00:05:25,510 on the contractors because dr. ben brown 101 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:27,370 team had been together for many many 102 00:05:35,250 --> 00:05:32,530 years we had built the s-1 stage for the 103 00:05:37,130 --> 00:05:35,260 Saturn one vehicle in-house and of 104 00:05:39,500 --> 00:05:37,140 course all of this 105 00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:39,510 unit boxes at that time we did not have 106 00:05:45,490 --> 00:05:43,530 a separate slice for the for the 107 00:05:49,940 --> 00:05:45,500 instrument unit then they were mounted 108 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:49,950 inside some of the structures within the 109 00:05:54,440 --> 00:05:53,010 launch vehicle so there was just just a 110 00:06:00,320 --> 00:05:54,450 lot of activity going on we were 111 00:06:03,290 --> 00:06:00,330 building the engine test stands the s1c 112 00:06:04,910 --> 00:06:03,300 test and a dynamic tower which is the 113 00:06:06,980 --> 00:06:04,920 large it was at the time the largest 114 00:06:08,960 --> 00:06:06,990 structure in the state of Alabama so 115 00:06:14,560 --> 00:06:08,970 there was just all kind of activity 116 00:06:20,440 --> 00:06:17,350 while the Saturn one was the clustering 117 00:06:22,990 --> 00:06:20,450 of redstone and and Jupiter launch 118 00:06:25,120 --> 00:06:23,000 vehicle system stages so that was the 119 00:06:27,430 --> 00:06:25,130 first clustering of the vehicle so there 120 00:06:30,070 --> 00:06:27,440 was a learning process there that went 121 00:06:32,980 --> 00:06:30,080 into it and course the start of the 122 00:06:34,960 --> 00:06:32,990 guidance and control system which you 123 00:06:36,760 --> 00:06:34,970 know that would ultimately evolve on 124 00:06:39,460 --> 00:06:36,770 into the Saturn one being Saturn five 125 00:06:42,430 --> 00:06:39,470 was also being developed and utilized on 126 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:42,440 them on that Saturn one program on the 127 00:06:48,730 --> 00:06:45,250 Saturn 1b of course the we used the 128 00:06:54,310 --> 00:06:48,740 first stage from the from the Saturn one 129 00:06:58,180 --> 00:06:54,320 and then we developed an s4 stage which 130 00:07:01,420 --> 00:06:58,190 evolved own into an s4 B stage that was 131 00:07:05,290 --> 00:07:01,430 a common stage used for the Saturn 5 so 132 00:07:08,650 --> 00:07:05,300 we got a real jump on the s4 B stage by 133 00:07:10,540 --> 00:07:08,660 virtue of using it on the Saturn 1b the 134 00:07:13,870 --> 00:07:10,550 same was true for the instrument unit 135 00:07:16,810 --> 00:07:13,880 the it was flown initially on the Saturn 136 00:07:19,090 --> 00:07:16,820 1b and then was used almost intact on 137 00:07:22,300 --> 00:07:19,100 the Saturn 5 so you can see we had a 138 00:07:25,930 --> 00:07:22,310 real jump on that and then the s1 work 139 00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:25,940 that we did on the Saturn 1 and 1b was a 140 00:07:31,210 --> 00:07:28,010 learning process for developing the 141 00:07:36,670 --> 00:07:31,220 cluster for the first stage on a Saturn 142 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:36,680 5 vehicle the one part that was not did 143 00:07:41,560 --> 00:07:38,450 not benefit from some of this early work 144 00:07:44,020 --> 00:07:41,570 was the s2 stage and that proved to be 145 00:07:49,460 --> 00:07:44,030 our most challenging undertaking on the 146 00:07:54,980 --> 00:07:52,520 we did not encounter any thing that 147 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:54,990 threatened our schedule on the s1c stage 148 00:07:59,720 --> 00:07:56,850 because of all of the preliminary work 149 00:08:02,930 --> 00:07:59,730 and a jump that Marshall was able to get 150 00:08:05,690 --> 00:08:02,940 by using our fields of facilities to 151 00:08:07,880 --> 00:08:05,700 build the early ground test stages and 152 00:08:10,070 --> 00:08:07,890 the flight test stages so I can't recall 153 00:08:12,470 --> 00:08:10,080 any great difficulties we had there not 154 00:08:13,940 --> 00:08:12,480 that we didn't have some we had a lot of 155 00:08:16,640 --> 00:08:13,950 them of course a lot of it was to be 156 00:08:18,710 --> 00:08:16,650 proven with new engine technology and 157 00:08:20,600 --> 00:08:18,720 new contagious but we had a lot of 158 00:08:24,650 --> 00:08:20,610 testing here on our engine test stands 159 00:08:28,280 --> 00:08:24,660 and on our own RS 1c tests and to kind 160 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:28,290 of work out all the all the difficulties 161 00:08:34,339 --> 00:08:32,250 that we had there likewise only s4b we 162 00:08:36,710 --> 00:08:34,349 did not have that many difficulties 163 00:08:40,070 --> 00:08:36,720 because it evolved from the s4 stage of 164 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:40,080 the s4 B got started very early so it 165 00:08:44,930 --> 00:08:42,210 was not under the same time constraint 166 00:08:46,610 --> 00:08:44,940 that the s2 the real problems came on 167 00:08:49,160 --> 00:08:46,620 the s2 it was a very challenging thing 168 00:08:50,810 --> 00:08:49,170 we brought a new contractor in that had 169 00:08:53,390 --> 00:08:50,820 not been involved on any of the previous 170 00:08:57,230 --> 00:08:53,400 programs and it was a challenge 171 00:09:00,380 --> 00:08:57,240 assignment challenging assignment you 172 00:09:04,820 --> 00:09:00,390 know from the very GetGo and then into 173 00:09:07,520 --> 00:09:04,830 the program the spacecraft began to grow 174 00:09:11,300 --> 00:09:07,530 in weight so we had to make a decision 175 00:09:14,030 --> 00:09:11,310 on whether to take the weight out of the 176 00:09:17,420 --> 00:09:14,040 spacecraft or out of the launch vehicle 177 00:09:18,980 --> 00:09:17,430 and dr. von Braun realized that it would 178 00:09:21,440 --> 00:09:18,990 be very very difficult to get it out of 179 00:09:24,110 --> 00:09:21,450 the spacecraft so he agreed to increase 180 00:09:26,900 --> 00:09:24,120 the launch performance capability of the 181 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:26,910 saturn v to do that we had to take 182 00:09:34,790 --> 00:09:30,450 weight out of the one of the stages and 183 00:09:37,100 --> 00:09:34,800 the s2 was determined to be the most 184 00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:37,110 viable way to do that because I think we 185 00:09:41,120 --> 00:09:38,850 had to take about 13 pounds of weight 186 00:09:43,790 --> 00:09:41,130 out of es1 sea stage to get 1 pound of 187 00:09:45,620 --> 00:09:43,800 payload capability whereas only s2 we 188 00:09:48,340 --> 00:09:45,630 could take out about 4 pounds of weight 189 00:09:53,630 --> 00:09:48,350 and gain one pound in payload capability 190 00:09:57,140 --> 00:09:53,640 so that decision really complicated an 191 00:09:59,420 --> 00:09:57,150 already tough job that we had I would 192 00:10:01,340 --> 00:09:59,430 say it was the biggest threat in my 193 00:10:02,820 --> 00:10:01,350 personal opinion from a launch vehicle 194 00:10:05,280 --> 00:10:02,830 standpoint of you 195 00:10:09,780 --> 00:10:05,290 that we had in being able to meet the 196 00:10:11,640 --> 00:10:09,790 landing within the decade we also had 197 00:10:15,360 --> 00:10:11,650 great difficulties in developing this 198 00:10:17,730 --> 00:10:15,370 new stage we actually blew up a couple 199 00:10:21,200 --> 00:10:17,740 of the didn't blow up we actually 200 00:10:24,570 --> 00:10:21,210 destroyed a couple of the ground test 201 00:10:26,640 --> 00:10:24,580 stages during tests and we had to cancel 202 00:10:29,100 --> 00:10:26,650 one of the ground test stages because we 203 00:10:31,950 --> 00:10:29,110 were running so far behind schedule so 204 00:10:33,660 --> 00:10:31,960 we were very limited and tests that of 205 00:10:35,910 --> 00:10:33,670 course we distemper destroyed a couple 206 00:10:39,320 --> 00:10:35,920 of test stands in the process of those 207 00:10:44,250 --> 00:10:39,330 failures so it was a very challenging 208 00:10:47,160 --> 00:10:44,260 assignment required allocating a lot 209 00:10:49,950 --> 00:10:47,170 more funds into the program to the 210 00:10:53,100 --> 00:10:49,960 contractor to try to buy back the 211 00:10:55,230 --> 00:10:53,110 schedule and and to try to keep it on 212 00:11:02,519 --> 00:10:55,240 schedule but it was very clearly the 213 00:11:09,990 --> 00:11:06,619 it's it's a very critical part to any 214 00:11:12,030 --> 00:11:10,000 major development of understanding what 215 00:11:13,829 --> 00:11:12,040 your requirements are what you what 216 00:11:16,319 --> 00:11:13,839 requirements you have to satisfy for 217 00:11:19,199 --> 00:11:16,329 example in the case of Saturn 5 we had 218 00:11:22,170 --> 00:11:19,209 to our initial commitment wants to put 219 00:11:25,019 --> 00:11:22,180 90,000 pounds into the lunar transfer 220 00:11:26,790 --> 00:11:25,029 trajectory you know within the decade 221 00:11:29,790 --> 00:11:26,800 that was a two primary assignments we 222 00:11:32,970 --> 00:11:29,800 had well you had to design a vehicle 223 00:11:34,949 --> 00:11:32,980 that would would do that to get that 224 00:11:36,900 --> 00:11:34,959 payload and to achieve that you had to 225 00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:36,910 allocate those requirements down to the 226 00:11:42,179 --> 00:11:39,850 various levels of the work breakdown 227 00:11:45,329 --> 00:11:42,189 structure right on down to the stage the 228 00:11:46,980 --> 00:11:45,339 engine and the various components had 229 00:11:49,530 --> 00:11:46,990 had to be determined and you had to 230 00:11:52,319 --> 00:11:49,540 define the the interfaces between the 231 00:11:54,900 --> 00:11:52,329 stages we had to define interfaces 232 00:11:57,090 --> 00:11:54,910 between our launch vehicle and the 233 00:12:00,689 --> 00:11:57,100 launch complex and between the launch 234 00:12:04,889 --> 00:12:00,699 vehicle and the spacecraft those have to 235 00:12:06,960 --> 00:12:04,899 be baselined and and track to be assured 236 00:12:07,889 --> 00:12:06,970 that you meet him they have to be 237 00:12:10,530 --> 00:12:07,899 qualified you have to have a 238 00:12:13,620 --> 00:12:10,540 qualification test program to prove that 239 00:12:16,889 --> 00:12:13,630 you have satisfy those requirements and 240 00:12:20,910 --> 00:12:16,899 once you have qualified it then you have 241 00:12:24,170 --> 00:12:20,920 to control that any change that you have 242 00:12:27,150 --> 00:12:24,180 active qualified hardware or software 243 00:12:29,780 --> 00:12:27,160 you you have to keep very close track of 244 00:12:32,850 --> 00:12:29,790 that to make sure that you have 245 00:12:35,490 --> 00:12:32,860 qualified that change and that you have 246 00:12:38,160 --> 00:12:35,500 incorporated it into the design so it's 247 00:12:40,410 --> 00:12:38,170 really a closed loop system that you 248 00:12:43,620 --> 00:12:40,420 have from requirements to incorporation 249 00:12:44,970 --> 00:12:43,630 of whatever that change is in the end of 250 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:44,980 the system it came from the DoD 251 00:12:50,939 --> 00:12:48,970 primarily we we used the I believe it 252 00:12:53,759 --> 00:12:50,949 was the Air Force configuration 253 00:12:56,100 --> 00:12:53,769 management manual and tailored it for 254 00:13:01,530 --> 00:12:56,110 the saturn v launch vehicle system and 255 00:13:05,819 --> 00:13:01,540 then that system was used then for the 256 00:13:07,410 --> 00:13:05,829 Saturn 1b and I think that did not apply 257 00:13:09,650 --> 00:13:07,420 the Saturn one it was pretty much behind 258 00:13:12,850 --> 00:13:09,660 us and Marshall had another means of 259 00:13:17,560 --> 00:13:12,860 controlling the requirements before the 260 00:13:22,430 --> 00:13:17,570 more formal system came along during the 261 00:13:28,940 --> 00:13:25,640 the only other thing that I felt that 262 00:13:31,340 --> 00:13:28,950 threatened our ability to get the job 263 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:31,350 done in two decade was the launch of a s 264 00:13:36,410 --> 00:13:34,170 502 which was a second Saturn 5 vehicle 265 00:13:38,960 --> 00:13:36,420 when we had the anomalies there we had a 266 00:13:43,130 --> 00:13:38,970 couple of engines to go out on on the 267 00:13:46,700 --> 00:13:43,140 second stage and were able fortunately 268 00:13:49,040 --> 00:13:46,710 because of the ingenuity of our in-house 269 00:13:51,710 --> 00:13:49,050 design people to design in such a way we 270 00:13:53,300 --> 00:13:51,720 were able to get on the spacecraft only 271 00:13:55,220 --> 00:13:53,310 into orbit by burning the three 272 00:13:57,740 --> 00:13:55,230 remaining engines only as two longer 273 00:13:59,960 --> 00:13:57,750 firing up the s4 be getting into Earth 274 00:14:03,110 --> 00:13:59,970 orbit but then after we got into Earth 275 00:14:05,350 --> 00:14:03,120 orbit we were unable to start the s4b 276 00:14:08,810 --> 00:14:05,360 stage because of a failure and the 277 00:14:13,910 --> 00:14:08,820 ignition spark ignition line of the j2 278 00:14:15,980 --> 00:14:13,920 engine but still again ingenuity of the 279 00:14:19,250 --> 00:14:15,990 Johnson spacecraft Center people were 280 00:14:22,100 --> 00:14:19,260 able to fire up the service module and 281 00:14:25,130 --> 00:14:22,110 get a partial completion of our mission 282 00:14:28,040 --> 00:14:25,140 objectives on that flight and then after 283 00:14:32,330 --> 00:14:28,050 that things really smooth out they were 284 00:14:39,980 --> 00:14:32,340 we did not have any other major threats 285 00:14:49,430 --> 00:14:44,240 I really hope the first one AAS 501 very 286 00:14:53,870 --> 00:14:49,440 high in my in my treasure chest I would 287 00:14:56,120 --> 00:14:53,880 say that is when all of the flight 288 00:14:58,930 --> 00:14:56,130 articles came together for the very 289 00:15:01,519 --> 00:14:58,940 first time at the Kennedy Space Center 290 00:15:04,420 --> 00:15:01,529 not only did we have a new launch 291 00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:04,430 vehicle going there that had not been 292 00:15:09,290 --> 00:15:08,010 flown before but we had a new launch 293 00:15:11,949 --> 00:15:09,300 complex 294 00:15:16,070 --> 00:15:11,959 we had a new automatic checkout system 295 00:15:17,630 --> 00:15:16,080 all the software flight software was 296 00:15:18,860 --> 00:15:17,640 coming together for the first time that 297 00:15:20,810 --> 00:15:18,870 we had done a lot of work on a 298 00:15:22,990 --> 00:15:20,820 breadboard here at Marshall in a 299 00:15:25,910 --> 00:15:23,000 facility close to located here to the 300 00:15:27,350 --> 00:15:25,920 communication center - to get that 301 00:15:29,300 --> 00:15:27,360 checked out as best we could on the 302 00:15:32,170 --> 00:15:29,310 ground but with all that coming together 303 00:15:35,870 --> 00:15:32,180 and and that launched in November of 304 00:15:38,810 --> 00:15:35,880 1967 was remarkable I'm telling you it 305 00:15:40,579 --> 00:15:38,820 was remarkable so I hold that one right 306 00:15:43,579 --> 00:15:40,589 up at the top of my list from a launch 307 00:15:46,940 --> 00:15:43,589 vehicle standpoint I have to consider it 308 00:15:48,829 --> 00:15:46,950 one well to use dr. van brown's word he 309 00:15:51,050 --> 00:15:48,839 said it was the greatest accomplishment 310 00:15:55,070 --> 00:15:51,060 at the Marshall Space Flight Center ever 311 00:15:57,170 --> 00:15:55,080 only surpassed by a s 506 the lunar 312 00:16:00,710 --> 00:15:57,180 landing to show you the significance of 313 00:16:03,949 --> 00:16:00,720 that my next one that I hold very highly 314 00:16:07,490 --> 00:16:03,959 was a s 503 we had just had the 315 00:16:11,180 --> 00:16:07,500 anomalies on 502 we were scheduled to 316 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:11,190 put a man on 503 but the criteria for 317 00:16:16,970 --> 00:16:13,850 putting a man on was two successive 318 00:16:20,600 --> 00:16:16,980 successful launches well five old days 319 00:16:23,860 --> 00:16:20,610 502 was not a total success as as we all 320 00:16:27,260 --> 00:16:23,870 know but because we were able to 321 00:16:29,930 --> 00:16:27,270 specifically identify the cause of the 322 00:16:32,750 --> 00:16:29,940 anomalies that we had on a s 502 and 323 00:16:35,960 --> 00:16:32,760 were able to replicate those failures or 324 00:16:37,010 --> 00:16:35,970 those anomalies on the ground design and 325 00:16:39,470 --> 00:16:37,020 build a fix 326 00:16:41,690 --> 00:16:39,480 get that qualified there was enough 327 00:16:44,500 --> 00:16:41,700 confidence at that time in fact the 328 00:16:48,460 --> 00:16:44,510 meeting was held right here at Marshall 329 00:16:50,900 --> 00:16:48,470 over in the H OSC building where the 330 00:16:53,069 --> 00:16:50,910 International Space Station payload 331 00:16:54,749 --> 00:16:53,079 Operations Group are now 332 00:16:58,949 --> 00:16:54,759 where we reviewed all the details in 333 00:17:03,180 --> 00:16:58,959 made a decision to put a man on a s 503 334 00:17:04,829 --> 00:17:03,190 that was a very very bold decision you 335 00:17:07,319 --> 00:17:04,839 know having encountered the difficulties 336 00:17:09,179 --> 00:17:07,329 on the prior flight and then I liked it 337 00:17:11,760 --> 00:17:09,189 so well because it was launched in late 338 00:17:14,669 --> 00:17:11,770 December Frank Borman and his crew were 339 00:17:18,620 --> 00:17:14,679 able to navigate the circumnavigate the 340 00:17:22,169 --> 00:17:18,630 the moon and made his wonderful 341 00:17:24,840 --> 00:17:22,179 announcement about the creation and we 342 00:17:27,329 --> 00:17:24,850 saw all the beautiful pictures of the of 343 00:17:29,909 --> 00:17:27,339 the earth from that vantage point I gave 344 00:17:32,520 --> 00:17:29,919 us great appreciation for the wonderful 345 00:17:35,909 --> 00:17:32,530 environment that we lived in and then of 346 00:17:38,909 --> 00:17:35,919 course AAS 506 was that was the climax 347 00:17:41,039 --> 00:17:38,919 of all of our efforts and of course that 348 00:17:47,190 --> 00:17:41,049 was a highlight for him for all of us 349 00:17:52,379 --> 00:17:49,830 in the past our history was that we 350 00:17:54,359 --> 00:17:52,389 would launch one stage with all dummy 351 00:17:56,099 --> 00:17:54,369 upper stages for the first slide and 352 00:17:58,560 --> 00:17:56,109 then we would add a second stage for the 353 00:18:01,249 --> 00:17:58,570 for the second flight the third stage 354 00:18:02,879 --> 00:18:01,259 for the for the third fly and so forth 355 00:18:06,450 --> 00:18:02,889 dr. Miller 356 00:18:08,369 --> 00:18:06,460 when he came to NASA and and that was in 357 00:18:10,529 --> 00:18:08,379 the early 60s on camera called exactly 358 00:18:13,619 --> 00:18:10,539 when but made the decision we were going 359 00:18:15,450 --> 00:18:13,629 all up on the very first fly that got a 360 00:18:18,259 --> 00:18:15,460 lot of discussion here at Marshall Space 361 00:18:20,879 --> 00:18:18,269 Flight Center as you can imagine because 362 00:18:24,029 --> 00:18:20,889 for the most part we were very 363 00:18:26,759 --> 00:18:24,039 conservative in our approach to to 364 00:18:28,349 --> 00:18:26,769 launch vehicle development that went 365 00:18:31,109 --> 00:18:28,359 against grain and they was a strong 366 00:18:33,749 --> 00:18:31,119 effort to get him to change his mind on 367 00:18:35,999 --> 00:18:33,759 that but he did not so dr. von Braun 368 00:18:37,889 --> 00:18:36,009 endorsed it we got behind it and it 369 00:18:44,220 --> 00:18:37,899 proved to be a right Waco we saved quite 370 00:18:52,049 --> 00:18:47,419 it was truly amazing to watch that and 371 00:18:55,049 --> 00:18:52,059 to see all of the lab directors working 372 00:18:58,380 --> 00:18:55,059 with Doc Brown and with the program 373 00:19:00,690 --> 00:18:58,390 managers in a room discussing progress 374 00:19:03,960 --> 00:19:00,700 problems solution to problems and and 375 00:19:07,650 --> 00:19:03,970 what have you and he was so good about 376 00:19:10,620 --> 00:19:07,660 getting inputs from everyone I don't 377 00:19:12,660 --> 00:19:10,630 think I ever saw him force somebody into 378 00:19:16,470 --> 00:19:12,670 something that they didn't they did not 379 00:19:17,909 --> 00:19:16,480 believe in if he had a little trouble 380 00:19:20,430 --> 00:19:17,919 getting them to come around to his point 381 00:19:22,770 --> 00:19:20,440 of view like on the all up concept he 382 00:19:25,230 --> 00:19:22,780 was so patient and and and worked with 383 00:19:29,220 --> 00:19:25,240 him until such time that they actually 384 00:19:32,250 --> 00:19:29,230 came around to supporting him the same 385 00:19:34,770 --> 00:19:32,260 was true when the decision was made on 386 00:19:37,080 --> 00:19:34,780 the mode that we would that NASA would 387 00:19:40,590 --> 00:19:37,090 use to go to the moon we were looking at 388 00:19:44,159 --> 00:19:40,600 a direct descent a lunar rendezvous and 389 00:19:45,510 --> 00:19:44,169 an earth oral run of you boo Marshall 390 00:19:46,919 --> 00:19:45,520 was favoring the earth orbital 391 00:19:49,530 --> 00:19:46,929 rendezvous because it required a 392 00:19:52,169 --> 00:19:49,540 building of a space station which had 393 00:19:54,150 --> 00:19:52,179 some merit we would have had a byproduct 394 00:19:56,789 --> 00:19:54,160 of the lunar landing with the space 395 00:19:59,010 --> 00:19:56,799 station had that been made but the 396 00:20:01,680 --> 00:19:59,020 johnson space craft center favored the 397 00:20:03,840 --> 00:20:01,690 lor thinking that was the most expedient 398 00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:03,850 way to get to the moon in the decade and 399 00:20:09,270 --> 00:20:06,610 again that was a decision that was 400 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:09,280 debated a long long time when the 401 00:20:13,020 --> 00:20:10,690 decision was made to go with the lunar 402 00:20:15,539 --> 00:20:13,030 roving vehicle but again dr. ben Brown 403 00:20:17,909 --> 00:20:15,549 supported that and the laboratory 404 00:20:19,560 --> 00:20:17,919 directors although they had difficulties 405 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:19,570 with it they did come around to 406 00:20:24,060 --> 00:20:21,730 supporting it and once a decision made 407 00:20:26,130 --> 00:20:24,070 we put our heart into it and there was 408 00:20:28,289 --> 00:20:26,140 no looking back that's the way we we 409 00:20:31,140 --> 00:20:28,299 move forward and I think it's extremely 410 00:20:34,140 --> 00:20:31,150 important that I also mentioned the name 411 00:20:38,760 --> 00:20:34,150 of the Saturn 5 program manager dr. 412 00:20:41,909 --> 00:20:38,770 Arthur Rudolph he assumed responsibility 413 00:20:45,409 --> 00:20:41,919 for managing the Saturn 5 vehicle I 414 00:20:49,770 --> 00:20:45,419 think around that November 1963 415 00:20:51,299 --> 00:20:49,780 timeframe in fact I came with him to to 416 00:20:54,920 --> 00:20:51,309 Marshall from the office of manned 417 00:20:58,380 --> 00:20:54,930 spaceflight at that time and 418 00:21:00,750 --> 00:20:58,390 hee hee was an uncanny person tremendous 419 00:21:02,790 --> 00:21:00,760 experience had done you know technology 420 00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:02,800 work on engine development and that's 421 00:21:07,980 --> 00:21:05,530 when they were in their infancy stage of 422 00:21:10,110 --> 00:21:07,990 development and right on through the 423 00:21:13,320 --> 00:21:10,120 vehicles developed by the Germans for 424 00:21:16,740 --> 00:21:13,330 world war ii he was responsible for the 425 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:16,750 production of those vehicles and and 426 00:21:21,630 --> 00:21:19,210 then he worked on the Redstone vehicle 427 00:21:23,580 --> 00:21:21,640 so we had a world of experience and I 428 00:21:26,370 --> 00:21:23,590 observed him as I observed him during 429 00:21:29,690 --> 00:21:26,380 the Apollo program I was always 430 00:21:32,730 --> 00:21:29,700 impressed with with his decision-making 431 00:21:36,870 --> 00:21:32,740 ability and I often told him I said art 432 00:21:38,790 --> 00:21:36,880 do you you really have a sixth sense in 433 00:21:41,040 --> 00:21:38,800 making some of those decisions it just 434 00:21:43,260 --> 00:21:41,050 always seemed to be solid and of course 435 00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:43,270 that was wisdom and knowledge gained 436 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:45,010 from all the years of experience that he 437 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:48,450 had as time went on I finally realized 438 00:21:55,650 --> 00:21:53,290 that it was really experience and wisdom 439 00:21:58,380 --> 00:21:55,660 not a sixth sense that he had it gave 440 00:22:01,260 --> 00:21:58,390 him a success but he just had an uncanny 441 00:22:03,900 --> 00:22:01,270 ability to analyze a problem and come up 442 00:22:06,360 --> 00:22:03,910 with a right solution so I tribute a lot 443 00:22:11,380 --> 00:22:06,370 of success to the Saturn 5 to to dr. 444 00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:14,200 caused great concern around the world 445 00:22:20,620 --> 00:22:16,730 because communism was really on the rise 446 00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:20,630 and it was great concern of its 447 00:22:25,060 --> 00:22:23,210 dominance not only of space but of you 448 00:22:27,760 --> 00:22:25,070 know of the democracies around the world 449 00:22:30,190 --> 00:22:27,770 a lot of pressure was put on President 450 00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:30,200 Kennedy and and on our national leaders 451 00:22:37,270 --> 00:22:34,610 to do something about that and the 452 00:22:41,140 --> 00:22:37,280 president asked Vice President Lyndon 453 00:22:44,290 --> 00:22:41,150 Johnson who was I think he was sharing 454 00:22:46,060 --> 00:22:44,300 the space Council at that time to look 455 00:22:50,800 --> 00:22:46,070 into the various options that we might 456 00:22:53,380 --> 00:22:50,810 have for overcoming the Russians and the 457 00:22:55,270 --> 00:22:53,390 the options were fairly limited for us 458 00:22:58,840 --> 00:22:55,280 to do that because the Russians had such 459 00:23:02,440 --> 00:22:58,850 a tremendous lead on the United States 460 00:23:05,020 --> 00:23:02,450 and the free world in him in launch 461 00:23:07,360 --> 00:23:05,030 vehicle capability the ability to put 462 00:23:09,760 --> 00:23:07,370 large payloads into orbit Vice President 463 00:23:11,410 --> 00:23:09,770 Johnson called together some of the 464 00:23:13,930 --> 00:23:11,420 experts around the country I'm one of 465 00:23:16,420 --> 00:23:13,940 which was dr. Van Brown to explore ideas 466 00:23:18,630 --> 00:23:16,430 for doing that and decision was made 467 00:23:22,330 --> 00:23:18,640 that we had to do something very bold 468 00:23:24,250 --> 00:23:22,340 using new technology technology that the 469 00:23:26,890 --> 00:23:24,260 Soviet Union did not have and would have 470 00:23:29,230 --> 00:23:26,900 difficulty development developing that 471 00:23:31,330 --> 00:23:29,240 technology was the only way that we 472 00:23:33,340 --> 00:23:31,340 would be able to leapfrog them and 473 00:23:37,630 --> 00:23:33,350 become the dominant national power in 474 00:23:40,330 --> 00:23:37,640 space so that is when recommendation was 475 00:23:43,360 --> 00:23:40,340 made from this group that Vice President 476 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:43,370 Johnson put together to recommend to the 477 00:23:50,080 --> 00:23:45,890 president that we we place a man on the 478 00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:50,090 moon and do that that required very much 479 00:23:54,970 --> 00:23:52,610 of a leap in technology and launch 480 00:23:56,680 --> 00:23:54,980 vehicle capability which the Soviet 481 00:23:58,450 --> 00:23:56,690 Union did not have in which we did not 482 00:24:00,460 --> 00:23:58,460 think they would be able to match us in 483 00:24:02,200 --> 00:24:00,470 the time frame that we had and by 484 00:24:05,320 --> 00:24:02,210 setting it in the end of the decade that 485 00:24:07,960 --> 00:24:05,330 put a lot of pressure on both to do that 486 00:24:09,790 --> 00:24:07,970 and of course with a successful launch I 487 00:24:12,340 --> 00:24:09,800 think we all know who won who won the 488 00:24:15,580 --> 00:24:12,350 race and there was a very significant 489 00:24:16,990 --> 00:24:15,590 political decision that he made more so 490 00:24:23,130 --> 00:24:17,000 than an engineering or scientific 491 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:27,029 I did not see any effect on what I was 492 00:24:32,490 --> 00:24:29,770 doing or what what the agency was doing 493 00:24:34,440 --> 00:24:32,500 I think we were more of an influence on 494 00:24:37,380 --> 00:24:34,450 the solution to the problem than we were 495 00:24:42,389 --> 00:24:37,390 the cause of the problem but I did not 496 00:24:45,470 --> 00:24:42,399 see any any negative outside influence 497 00:24:48,299 --> 00:24:45,480 on the Apollo program both 498 00:24:50,250 --> 00:24:48,309 african-american and and women were 499 00:24:51,930 --> 00:24:50,260 emerging then in the science and 500 00:24:54,419 --> 00:24:51,940 engineering field and they were employed 501 00:24:57,269 --> 00:24:54,429 so you know I think we were kind of 502 00:25:00,690 --> 00:24:57,279 ahead of the power curve in making 503 00:25:03,299 --> 00:25:00,700 happen what the nation was trying to get 504 00:25:04,620 --> 00:25:03,309 accomplished you know primarily well 505 00:25:08,760 --> 00:25:04,630 throughout the nation and certainly in 506 00:25:14,910 --> 00:25:08,770 the south so yes I think that that had a 507 00:25:25,310 --> 00:25:19,470 I really believe that it demonstrated to 508 00:25:28,860 --> 00:25:25,320 the world that the United States could 509 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:28,870 could do almost the impossible when 510 00:25:35,010 --> 00:25:32,890 they've set a firm goal to it and and 511 00:25:35,550 --> 00:25:35,020 put the resources behind it to get it 512 00:25:38,460 --> 00:25:35,560 done 513 00:25:39,210 --> 00:25:38,470 they thing which impressed me so very 514 00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:39,220 much 515 00:25:43,620 --> 00:25:41,530 was the fact that throughout the program 516 00:25:46,650 --> 00:25:43,630 even with the difficulty that we had 517 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:46,660 along the way the president was behind 518 00:25:51,510 --> 00:25:49,450 that program the Congress was behind it 519 00:25:55,350 --> 00:25:51,520 they provided ample funds for us to get 520 00:25:57,570 --> 00:25:55,360 the job done the media was behind it we 521 00:26:00,060 --> 00:25:57,580 did not have a lot of second guessing or 522 00:26:03,500 --> 00:26:00,070 backbiting going on there and the public 523 00:26:06,480 --> 00:26:03,510 was behind it so I think the fact that 524 00:26:10,770 --> 00:26:06,490 we demonstrated with the Apollo program 525 00:26:12,930 --> 00:26:10,780 that you could accomplish whatever you